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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NT~\TE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
D~\ VID WAYNE BANFORD, 
Defenda,nt and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9395 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
On January 5, 1960, the defendant David Wayne 
Banford plead guilty to the crime of second degree bur-
glary, 76-9-3, U.C.A. 1953, in the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District, and on January 19, 1960, he 
\\·as sentenced to confinement for one to twenty years. 
The instant appeal is based on a claim that the plea of 
guilty was not properly taken because of the absence of 
counsel and the failure of the Court to instruct the de-
fendant as to the consequences of his plea of guilty. 
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DISPOSITION OF MATTER BEFORE THE 
LOWER COURT 
The defendant plead guilty to the crime of second de-
gree burglary in the Second Judicial District on January 
5, 1960. On January 19, 1960, after referral of his case to 
Adult Probation and Parole for a pre-sentence report;the 
defendant was sentenced to one to twenty years confine-
ment. Notice of appeal was filed on February 19, 1960. 
On January 19, 1960, the defendant \vas committed to the 
State Prison. On August 9, 1960, Judge John R. Wahl-
quist entered an order allowing the defendant's release 
pending appeal upon the posting of a $2,000 bond (R. 16}, 
and on August 16, 1960, the defendant was released from 
the State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Affirmance of the lower court's actions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant claims that he was a minor at the 
time of entering his plea of guilty and that he was not 
provided counsel before entering his plea, and that since 
he was not admonished as to the consequences of his plea, 
his plea was a nullity requiring reYersal, and a new trial. 
The facts of record disclose that on December 18, 
1959, the defendant was brought before the Justice's 
Court, South Central Precinct, Davis County, by virtue 
of a warrant of arrest and complaint upon the charge of 
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~eeond degree burg-lary ( R .. 1). He was there advised of 
his right to be ''represented by counsel'' and of other 
rights he may have had. The defendant waiYed prelimi-
nary hearing (R. 1), and by orde~ of the Justice of the 
Peace was bound over to the District Court for trial 
(H. 2). An information was filed and on January 5, 1960, 
the defendant and two other companions were brought 
before the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
for joint arraignment on the charge of second degree bur-
glary (R. 24). The arraignment transcript discloses the 
following transaction (R. 25) : 
''THE CouRT: The record will show this is the 
time set for the arraignment of Edwin Oscar 
Fillen, Da.vid Wayne Banford, and Dennis Austin. 
You may read the Information. 
''Each of them have a copy, do they not, Mr. 
Anderson'f 
''MR. ANDERSON: Yes. 
''THE CouRT: The record will show each of them 
received a copy of the Information. (Information 
read by Clerk of Court.) * * * '' 
Thereafter, Edwin Oscar Fillen, joint defendant with 
appellant, was asked if he desired counsel, told that he 
needn't proceed further until he had counsel, and that he 
could have 48 hours before entering his plea (R. 26). 
Fillen waived counsel and the time period, and thereafter 
entered a plea of guilty. Then the Court directed its 
attention to the appellant and the following occurred 
(R. 26): 
'' l\Ir. David Wayne Banford, if you are not desig-
nated in this information by your true and correct 
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name, you may declare your true name now, or be 
prosecuted under the name of David Wayne 
Banford. 
''MR. BANFORD : That's my name. 
''THE CouRT: The Court informs you that you 
are entitled to be represented by an attorney, and 
need take no affirmalive steps until you have 
counsel. Is it your desire to have an attorney? 
' ' MR. BANFORD : No sir. 
''THE CouRT: Do you waive services of an attor-
ney in open Court? 
' ' MR. BANFORD : Yes sir. 
''THE CouRT: The Court advises you that you 
may have and take at least 48 hours before you 
are required to plead to the information charging 
you with burglary in the second degree, or you 
may waive that time and enter your plea now. 
":JIR. BANFORD: I waive it. 
''THE CouRT: The record \Yill so show. To the 
Information charging you "\Yith burglary in the 
second degree, what is your plea~ Guilty or not 
guilty~ 
''MR. BANFORD: Guilty, sir. 
''THE CouRT: The record will show the defendant 
enters a plea of guilty, and upon such plea the 
Court adjudicates him guilty of the offense 
charged. * * *. '' (Emphasis supplied) 
Thereafter a similar procedure "\Yas followed in the 
case of Dennie Austin, in the presence of the defendant. 
The Court thereafter referred all cases to the Adult 
Probation and Parol Department (R. 28), and expressly 
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indiea ted that he \Vas not granting the defendant or the 
others probation ( R. 29). 
The reeord further reflects that on the 19th of Jan-
nary, 1960, the appellant was again brought before the 
Court for determination of the sentence to be imposed 
(R. 20). The appellant \vas not represented by counsel 
( R. 15), but he responded as to questions put to him by 
the trial judge in open court, and had apparently con-
sulted \vith the probation officer (R. 20). He intelligently 
responded to the court's questions, and from the conver-
sation it appears appellant was married (R. 21), and 
had spent at least two terms in the State Industrial 
School. Whether a. passing reference of the attitude of 
the administration of the Industrial School can be taken 
to support a claim that defendant was a minor is ques-
tionable, but since the State feels the issue to be imma-
terial it will assume that the defendant was less than 21 
years old. The court sentenced the defendant to confine-
ment for one to twenty years in the State Prison, where-
upon the defendant, upon his own motion, asked for a 
''stay of execution'' to get his affairs in order, which 
was denied (R. 22). 
The notice of appeal was filed after the defendant 
had been confined in prison for about 30 days. At no 
time did the appellant ever indicate a desire for counsel, 
deny his guilt, or evidence any incomprehension of the 
charges or procedures. 
The defendant has raised five points upon which he 
claims error. Four of these relate to the issue of counsel. 
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The State will respond to all of these points under Point 
I of its brief, and will reply to the remaining contention 
in Point II. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I 
THE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY AD-
VISED WITH REFERENCE TO HIS RIGHTS 
TO COUNSEL AND WAIVED HIS RIGHT 
THERETO. 
PoiNT II. 
THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
ADMONISH THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT 
WARRANT REVERSAL UNDER THE F .A.CTS 
OF THE INSTAKT C ... ~SE. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
THE DEFENDANT \\i'" AS PROPERLY AD-
VISED WITH REFERENCE TO HIS RIGHTS 
TO COUNSEL AND WAIVED HIS RIGHT 
THERETO. 
The record reflects that at the time of the hearing 
before the Davis County magistrate prior to being bound 
over to District Court, the defendant "\Yas advised of his 
right to counsel (R. 1), and after being bound over, at the 
time of arraignment, the court informed the defendant 
that he was entitled to counsel, and that he need take no 
affirmative steps until he had counsel (R. 26). The defend-
ant indicated he did not desire to have an attorney (R. 27) 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and expressly \vaived his right thereto. Thereafter, he 
entered his plea of guilty. He was also provided with a 
eopy of the information, "~hich was read, (R. 25) and \vas 
present while the other defendants \vere also advised of 
their right to counsel. 
The issue raised with reference to the question of 
\vhether the defendant, being a minor, could properly 
\Yaive counsel \Vas before the Supreme Court in State v. 
Spiers, 12 U. 2d 14, 361 P. 2d 509 (1961), where the facts 
were similar to those here raised. The same legal argu-
ment was raised in support of reversal. The Supreme 
Court rejected the contention of error, stating: 
''It is argued that the evidence shows that Spiers 
was only 19 years old, that he was immature for 
his age, that his I. Q. was only 75, that he grad-
uated from high school with low grades and was 
obviously some"·hat immature for his age. The 
burden is upon the defendant to show that he 
has been denied his constitutional rights. The trial 
court, after hearing the witnesses and seeing 
appellant give his testimony, was in much better 
position than we to judge his intelligence. There 
was no evidence of fear or coercion, or any other 
reason why he was induced to waive his rights 
other than he thought the course he took was for 
his best good. There was nothing to indicate that 
at any stage of the proceedings he did not under-
stand what was going on, the questions asked, or 
the effect of his waiver of counsel. In view of this 
situation \Ve conclude that the trial court's finding 
that he intelligently waived his right to counsel 
must be sustained.'' 
The similarity of the Spiers case to the issues now before 
the Court adequately disposes of any claim that the de-
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fendant, being a minor, could not waive counsel, or that 
being under age 21, must be presumed incompetent. The 
Utah law is settled to the contrary. In the instant case the 
record shows the magistrate properly advised the defend-
ant of his rights in accord \\Tith Section 77-15-1, U.C.A. 
1953, and again at arraignment under Section 77-22-12, 
U.C.A. 1953. In both instances he \vaived counsel. There is 
no evidence of record to indicate any incompetency or ina-
hili ty to understand the proceedings or rights afforded. 
Indeed, Section 76-1-41, U.C.A. 1953, seems to imply a 
presumption of competency where the defendant is over 
14. In view of the fact that the defendant is married, 
under Utah law the defendant has obtained his majority. 
15-2-1, U.C.A. 1953. 
The trial judge had full opportunity to observe the 
defendant at arraignment, and at sentencing, as well as 
the probation report. In the absence of any showing of 
record, the matter of the defendant's fitness to proceed 
must be left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and 
in vie'v of the defendant's past record and his request for 
a ''stay of execution,'' there is no room for doubt as to 
the defendant's competency to waive his rights. State v. 
Spiers, supra. 
The defendant claims that even so the court should 
have forced him to consult 'vith counsel. Article I, Sec-
tion 12 of the State Constitution giYes a person the right 
to proceed without counsel if he so desires, and the failure 
to accord a defendant that right may itself be error. State 
v. Penderville, 2 U. 2d 281, 272 P. 2d 195 (1954). The 
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accused has the right to "\vaive counsel, and a. court may 
uot force counsel upon him. Certainly where he has been 
afforded the opportunity to have counsel, appraised of 
right to counsel, has indicated no desire for counsel, and 
has a constitutional right to defend himself, it would 
place a trial judge in a dilemma. to require him to require 
the defendant to consult with counsel. Sta.te v. Petrucelli, 
:ri N. J. Super. 1, 116 A. 2d 721. 
Finally, it is urged that there could be no intelligent 
'YaiYer of the right to counsel unless the defendant was 
told that, if a pauper, he could still have counsel. At the 
outset, it should be noted that the record of arraignment 
and sentencing does not clearly indicate impecuniosity, 
but even so, it is submitted that in the instant case a 
proper and intelligent waiver was made. 
What we are here concerned with is whether 77-22-12, 
U.C.A. 1953 was complied with. A clear reading of the 
statute shows that it was. It provides: 
"If the defendant appears for arraignment with-
out counsel, he must be informed by the court that 
it is his right to have counsel before being 
arraigned, and must be asked whether he desires 
the aid of counsel. If he desires, but is unable to 
. employ, counsel, the court must assign counsel to 
defend him." (Emphasis supplied) 
A clear reading of the statute commands only that 
the trial judge ask the defendant if he desires counsel. 
This was done in the instant case. If a desire is mani-
fested, the court should then determine from the accused 
his ability to employ counsel. In the instant case the trial 
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judge was relieved from such a duty because the accused 
did not indicate a desire for an attorney. 
In State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P. 2d 178 (1943), 
the court seemed to note that the duty to obtain counsel 
or advise, with reference to impecunious persons, that 
the state will supply counsel, arises on an indication from 
an accused, at least, that he desires counsel. Defendant 
cites cases which he claims stand for the proposition that 
advice must be given that counsel will be appointed even 
if impecunious. The majority of these cases appear to 
involve a situation where no advice was given at all, and 
one indicates some evidence of impecuniosity plus a 
desire for counsel. It is sufficient to point out that other 
cases have gone against the position advocated by de-
fendant. In People v. Van Cour, 137 NYS 2d 167 (1954), 
the court said : 
''There is no requirement in law that a defendant 
be advised that he may have counsel and that the 
court will furnish such counsel without the neces-
sity of the defendant paying him, if he is unable 
to do so. The requirements have been satisfied 
if the defendant is advised that he has a right to 
counsel * * *. '' 
In People v. Thompson, 108 P. 2d 105 (Cal. 1940), 
the court reached the same result, stating: 
''The :first specification of error is the failure of 
the court to adequately advise the defendant re-
garding his right to counsel and that if he was 
unable to employ counsel the court would assign 
counsel to defend him. The statement on appeal 
discloses that at the time of the arraignment the 
10 
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defendant was asked by the court \vhether or not 
he had counsel or desired to obtain counsel. De-
fendant \vas not told that counsel would be as-
signed to him if he was unable to employ an attor-
ney, nor was defendant asked regarding his inabil-
ity to employ one. Defendant stated that he did 
not desire counsel. In view of this statement of 
the defendant we know of no statutory or consti-
tutional provision requiring the court to impose 
counsel upon him. The right to be represented by 
counsel was one for him to enjoy or waive, as he 
desired.'' 
In State v. Rigg, 95 N. W., 2d 252 (Minn. 1959), the 
~Iinnesota Court held that there was sufficient compliance 
\vith the Minnesota statutory provisions, similar to those 
of Utah, where the accused was advised of the right to 
counsel, no reference to impecuniosity being made, and 
defendant indicated he didn't want a lawyer. 
It is submitted that the Utah statute was adequately 
complied \Yith under the circumstances, and that the 
accused made an intelligent and understanding waiver of 
counsel. 
PoiNT II. 
THE F AlLURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
AD:JIOXISH THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT 
WARRANT REVERSAL UNDER THE FACTS 
OF THE IXSTANT CASE. 
The State will concede that under the provisions of 
Section 77-24-6, U. C. A. 1953, a duty is placed upon the 
trial court to admonish an accused of the consequences 
of a plea of guilty where the accused is without counsel. 
11 
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It will further concede that the failure of the trial court 
to directly admonish the defendant was irregular. The 
only issue presented, therefore, is whether that failure 
warrants a reversal of the trial court's action in adjudi-
cating the defendant guilty. 
The general rule is that a plea of guilty ,,,.aives any 
defect not jurisdictional. Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 
4th Ed., Sec. 91. The determination of whether or not 
the failure to admonish is jurisdictional depends upon 
the construction to be given 77-24-6, U.C.A. 1953, and 
must be based upon the intent of the Legislature. It may 
be generally said that apart from a statutory require-
ment, there is no requirement at law, jurisdictional in 
nature, that makes mandatory the admonishment of a 
defendant prior to the acceptance of a plea of guilty. 
Johnson v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. Rep. 625, 48 S. W. 70 
(1898); Berliner v. State, 6 Tex. App. 181 (1879); People 
v. Brown, 87 Colo. 261, 286 Pac. 859 (1930}. Some courts 
have engrafted the requirement onto their criminal pro-
cedure in capital cases. Commonwealth v. Battis, 11\Ia.ss. 
95 (1804); State v. Hill, 81 W.Va. 676,95 S. E. 21 (1918). 
However, the instant case is non-capital, and the determi-
nation to be made is, did the Legislature intend to make 
the requirement jurisdictional? 
It is conceded that the present statute was taken 
from the 1930 ALI Code of Criminal Procedure, and as 
introduced into the Legislature, read: 
''Where the defendant is not represented by 
counsel, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty 
12 
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until it shall have explained to the defendant the 
consequences of such plea; but a failure of the 
court to ('.rplain the consequences of the plea shall 
not affect the validity of any proceeding in the 
cause." (Emphasis supplied) 
The italicized portion of the ALI proposal was de-
leted from the statute as it was finally passed. An analysis 
of contemporaneous publications, IV Utah Bar Bulletin, 
1935; V Utah Bar Bulletin; and p. 670, ALI, Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1930, gives no clue as to what the 
intent of the Legislature was in deleting the above itali-
cized portion. It would appear that none of the statutes 
upon \\'"hich Section 224 of the ALI Code was predicated 
seem to have been concerned with making the advice 
jurisdictional, but were interested in showing that the 
plea "\Yas not based upon any unwarranted persuasion. 1 
The most reasonable construction to be given Section 
77-24-6, U.C.A. 1953, is to construe it in harmony with 
77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953, which is similar to Section 461 of 
the .J._~LI, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1930, which section 
"\Yas based in part on the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, 
Sec. 9231. Such a construction would require a finding 
of prejudice since Section 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953 reads: 
'' .J._.\fter hearing an appeal the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or defects 
"\Yhich do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. If error has been committed, it shall not 
be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The 
court must be satisfied that it has that effect be-
1 Comp. Laws Colo. 1921, Sec. 7095; Illinois Rev. Stat. 1929, Ch. 
38, Sec. 756; S. Dak. Rev. Code, 1919, Sec. 4741; Tex. Rev. Cr. 
Stat. 1925, Art. 501; Mich. Pub. Acts No. 175, VIII, Sec. 35, 1927. 
13 
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fore it is warranted in reversing judgment.'' (Em-
phasis supplied) 
In addition, such a construction would probably be in 
accord with 77-22-18, which indicates a plea shall waive 
all defects in the arraignment. 
A showing of a prejudicial effect from the failure 
to so admonish a defendant would require a reversal of 
the conviction since a showing of prejudice would void the 
adjudication of guilty and then destroy the effect of the 
plea of guilty. In the absence of prejudice where it 
appears that the defendant was in no way harmed by the 
failure to admonish, no substantial reason would require 
reversal and the plea could stand. Certainly where it 
appears that a defendant, unfamiliar with court procedure 
or the possibilities that could flow from his plea, enters 
a plea without admonition, it may be presumed preju-
dicial, but in the instant case no basis for claiming any 
prejudice exists. 
The defendant here "waived" the 48-hour waiting 
period before entering his plea (R. 27), and, according 
to the record, had been in the State Industrial School 
twice, was married, had been somewhat uncooperative 
with the pre-sentence investigating officer, and had com-
mitted other burglaries than those charged (R. 20, 21). 
Prior to the date fixed for sentencing and on the same 
day as the defendant plead guilty, the Court admon-
ished the defendant that he may well not receive proba-
tion. The Court said ( R. 28) : 
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·'No\\· I \vant to warn all of you that if you lie to 
~Ir. Larsen, we'll know about it. If I find out that 
any one of you lied, you \\·on 't get any kind of pro-
bation consideration. I ~cant to warn you now that 
I'rn not granting you probation. I don't know 
\\"hether I'll give you probation or not. You have 
acted like a bunch of blamed fools.'' (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Although this transpired after the plea, when coupled 
\vith the absence of any protest on the part of the defend-
ant, and the fact that when the defendant came back into 
court for sentencing he failed to indicate any desire to 
change his plea or receive other relief, the conclusion 
arises that defendant was aware of the consequences of 
his plea. This is bolstered by the previous record and 
experience of the defendant. 
Upon receiving his sentence, the defendant merely 
requested a ''stay of execution'' to get his affairs in 
order, and in no way protested the sentence. At the time 
of arraignment he was furnished a copy of the informa-
tion and advised of his right to counsel (R. 24, 26, 27). 
His first protest to his sentence was the filing of his 
own notice of appeal approximately a month after 
commitment. 
Under these circumstances it must be concluded that 
the defendant plead knowing full well the effect of his 
plea, and now, as an afterthought, being disgruntled at 
the result, seeks relief from its effect. Under these cir-
cumstances no prejudice resulted to the defndant, and 
the Court should conclude that the failure to admonish 
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the defendant under 77-24-6, U.C.A. 1953, does not, in this 
instance, require reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The claims of the defendant are, for the most part, 
without merit based upon previous decisions of this 
Court, and the balance of the alleged errors cannot be 
said to have resulted in his prejudice. 
As to the defendant's claim that reversal is required 
by 77-24-6, U.C.A. 1953, it is submitted that the proper 
construction to be given to the statute is the one urged 
by the State. As is said in Sutherland, Statutory Con-
struction, 3rd Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 5601 : 
''While it is true that there is great justification to 
be found in the common law principles creating 
safeguards in favor of the accused, nevertheless 
it cannot be denied that too rigid application of the 
rules of procedure have brought about undesirable 
consequences.'' 
Certainly a construction that averts reversal """here the 
record affirmatively shows the absence of prejudice 
accords with proper criminal judicial administration. 
The Court should affirm the conviction. 
Respectively submitted 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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